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ELECTION CONTESTS AND THE ELECTORAL VOTE
BY L. KINVIN WROTH*
The extremely close presidential election of 1960 stirred a problem that
has long lain dormant. As the result of a recount of the popular vote in
Hawaii, Congress, in its joint meeting to count the electoral vote, was
presented with conflicting returns from a state for the first time since the
Hayes-Tilden controversy of 1877. Since the outcome of the election was
not affected, the joint meeting accepted the result of the recount proceeding,
and the votes given by Hawaii's Democratic electors were counted.' The
once fiercely agitated question of the location and nature of the power to
decide controversies concerning the electoral vote was thus avoided.
This question, arising from an ambiguity in the Constitution, has long
been deemed settled by the statutory provisions for the count of the electoral
vote made in the aftermath of the Hayes-Tilden controversy.2 The system
for resolving electoral disputes which this legislation embodies has never been
tested, however. The events of 1960 raise serious doubts as to whether the
present provisions would be effective either in resolving election contests on
their merits or in producing a smooth solution to a political crisis on the
order of 1877. Moreover, Mr. Kennedy's narrow margin is a reminder
that the possibility of controversy is always present. With broad electoral
reforms once again under consideration in Congress,3 it seems appropriate
to take a fresh look at the present constitutional and statutory scheme for
dealing with disputed electoral votes.
The basis of our system of electing a President is laid down in the
Constitution, which provides that
Each State shall appoint in such manner as the legislature
thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be
entitled in Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or person
* Teaching Fellow, Dickinson School of Law; B.A., Yale University; LL.B.,
Harvard University.
1. 107 CONG. REC. 281-284 (daily ed., Jan. 6, 1961). For an account of the proceedings in Hawaii, see infra, notes 78-81.
2. Act of Feb. 3, 1887, ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373, [hereinafter referred to as the Electoral
Count Act]. For subsequent legislative history, see infra, notes 61, 63, and 76.
The Act provoked considerable debate following its passage, but recent commentators
have treated it only in passing, or have viewed it as solving all problems. See Burgess,
The Law of the Electoral Count, 3 POL. Sci. Q. 633 (1888) ; Carlisle, DangerousDefects
in Our Electoral System, 24 FORUM 257, 264 (1897) ; DOUGHERTY, THE ELECTORAL
SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 214-249 (1906) ; Tansill, Congressional Control of the
Electoral System, 34 YALE L.J. 511, 524 (1925) ; Mullen, The Electoral College and
Presidential Vacancies, 9 MD. L. REV. 28, 41-42 (1948) ; Dixon, Electoral College Procedure, 3 WEST. POL. Sci. Q. 214, 222-223 (1950) ; WILMERDING, THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE XI (1958).
3. Infra, note 117.
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holding an office of trust or profit under the United States shall
be appointed an elector.
The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors
and the day on which they shall give their votes, which day shall
4
be the same throughout the United States.
The actions of the electors are regulated by the Twelfth Amendment :"
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote
by ballot for President and Vice President, one of whom, at least
shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; . . .
they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President
and of all persons voted for as Vice President, and of the number
of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed
to the President of the Senate ;-The President of the Senate shall,
in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open
all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted ;-The person
having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors
appointed.
The only other constitutional limitations on the election of a President are
those which establish the age and citizenship requirements for eligibility to
the office.0
Pursuant to the constitutional plan the electors are "appointed"-now
uniformly by popular vote-on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November. 7 The procedure for counting the vote and ascertaining the result varies
from state to state, 8 but in general it is something like this: The ballots, or
the contents of the voting machines, are tabulated at the polls by precinct
election judges, who send their tally sheets forward to a county canvassing
board. This board makes an abstract of the votes shown for each candidate
in the precinct returns, which it sends to a state canvassing or returning
board. The state board tallies all the county returns and determines who
have been appointed electors. This result is then relayed to the governor
of the state, who under federal law is required to make a certificate of the
result based on this ascertainment and forward it to Washington. 9 The
electors, who have also received the governor's certificate, meet on the
Monday after the second Wednesday in December to cast their votes, which
4.

U.S. CONST. art. II,

§

1.

5. See infra, notes 18 and 28.
6. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1.
7. 3 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). As to state methods of appointment, see Wilkinson, The
Electoral Process and the Power of the States, 47 A.B.A.J. 251, 253-4 (1961).

8. See HARRIS, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
9. 3 U.S.C. § 6 (1958). See infra, note 63.

IN THE UNITED STATES,

236-307 (1934).

THE ELECTORAL VOTE

19611

they certify and send to the President of the Senate. 10 On January 6th, at
a joint meeting of Congress, these votes are opened and tabulated and the
result declared."
At a number of points in this process, controversies may arise which
could affect the validity of a state's electoral vote. (1) There may be fraud
or error at the polls on the part of voters or election officials. (2) There
may be fraud or error in the initial count of the ballots at the precinct level.
(3) There may be fraud or error on the part of the county or state canvassing board, or one of these agencies may abuse whatever powers are
given to it by state law. (4) The governor may act fraudulently or erroneously in certifying the electors. (5) An elector may be appointed who
is constitutionally ineligible for the office. (6) The electors may act erroneously in the signing and sealing of their certificates of the vote. (7) The
electors may cast their votes for an ineligible person. (8) The electors may
vote on a day other than that ordained by Congress. (9) The electors may
be influenced by fraud or a third party may somehow tamper with their
deliberations. (10) The right of a state to participate in an election, or of a
particular government to attest to the acts of a state may be called in question.
This group of controversies may be divided into those concerning the
recognition of state governments and the status of states; those concerning
the qualifications and acts of the electors in giving their votes; and those
concerning the manner in which the popular vote is given, counted, canvassed
and communicated to Congress. The problems of greatest importance are
those of the last class. Questions of statehood and the recognition of state
governments are unlikely to arise short of another Civil War. When they
do come up, Congress has sole jurisdiction.' 2 Questions concerning the
electors would be important in a great crisis such as that of 1877,13 but they
involve technicalities which are no longer of the essence of our electoral
system. We view our presidential elections as popular elections. If the President is to take office free of uncertainty or scandal that might weaken his
authority, controversies concerning the popular vote in a close election must
be promptly resolved by a method that leaves no doubt of its fairness on
the merits.
Problems of all three classes arose during the stormy century of legislative history which culminated in the Electoral Count Act of 1887.14 Con10. 3 U.S.C. §§ 7-11. To insure safe arrival of the electors' certificates, five
duplicates are deposited with various other officers. Id., § 11. Provision is made for
the President of the Senate to send for these duplicates if necessary. Id., §§ 12-14. See

20 OPs.

ATT'Y GEN.

522 (1893).

11. Id., §§ 15-18.
12. See infra, note 30.
13. See infra, note 53.
14. Supra, note 2. The history of the electoral system can be only sketched here.
For fuller treatment, see McKNIGHT, THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES
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troversy focused on the congressional counting sessions, where three great
questions were continually agitated. First, does the Constitution give the
President of the Senate sole power to exercise whatever discretion the
count involves, or are the two Houses of Congress the final judge of the
validity of votes? Secondly, is the power to count merely the power to
enumerate votes given by electors declared by state authority to have been
appointed, or is there power to determine the correctness of the state
authority's declaration and to examine the validity of the acts of the electors?
Thirdly, whatever the scope of the power, how is the evidence necessary to
a decision to be presented, and by what means is the decision to be made?
Close scrutiny of the debates of the Constitutional Convention reveals
no direct discussion of these problems. The possibility that a dispute might
arise with which Congress would have to deal does not seem to have been
considered. In fact, the machinery of the Electoral College, a compromise
between popular election and election by Congress, was designed to provide
a means for the election of a President free from any hint of the evils of
Congressional influence. 15 The plain implication of the original scheme is
that the states in their control of the manner of appointment were to provide
for the settlement of whatever controversies might arise. Only local interests
would be at stake in the appointment process, because the electors were to
be independent of any presidential candidate' 6 and would thus be chosen
solely on their own merits. Local authorities would naturally resolve any
contest.
While state control guarded state interests, other features of the plan
protected the national interest. If certain states failed to appoint electors,
17
the President was still elected by a majority of those who were appointed.
If no state had appointed electors, the provisions for failure of a majority
8
would come into play, and the election would devolve upon the House.'
(1878) ; DOUGHERTY, op. cit. supra, note 2; STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY
1788 TO 1897 (Bolton ed. 1926) ; Tansill, supra, note 2. A complete compilation
of all congressional proceedings on the subject from 1789 until 1876 may be found in
House Special Committee on Counting Electoral Votes, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 13, 44th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1877) [Hereinafter cited as Counting Electoral Votes]. When appropriate, reference will be made to this work, rather than to the original sources in the
congressional debates. Dates will be given, however, so that the referenced matter may
be found in the original.
15. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 109, 501 (Farrand ed.,
1911). The Convention wavered between election by Congress and a number of other
methods. The Congressional plan was actually approved and then reconsidered. Id. 101,
171.
16. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1; 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra, note
15, at 500-501. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 452 (Ford ed. 1898) (Hamilton).
17. Before the present language was adopted in the Convention, a motion that
the provision read "who shall have balloted," intended to prevent the number needed
for a majority from being increased by non-voting electors, was lost. 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra, note 15 at 515.
18. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1; cf. id., amend. XII. In the original provision, if the
FROM
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The method for electing a President may be contrasted with the provisions
for congressional elections. In the latter instance, as Hamilton pointed out in
9 Congress must have ultimate control over the manner of
the Federalist,'
election of its own members, lest the states, by refusing to elect Congressmen,
cause the whole structure to fall. In the case of the presidency, since the
House was ready to carry out the election if the states failed, congressional
control was not only undesirable but unnecessary.
The absence of two elements in the original plan made it impossible to
determine when a state had failed in its obligations. No provision was made
for the states to validate their choice of electors to Congress, and the power
to determine what were valid votes was neither defined nor expressly
granted. The former gap was filled in 1792 by a statute providing that the
"executive authority" of each state was to give to the electors a certificate
of their appointment which they were to forward to the President of the
Senate with their votes. 20 That this provision did not solve the problem,
however, became apparent as the result of a development unforeseen in the
Convention. After a very few elections the electors virtually lost their
independence. 2 1 Their election thus took on a national interest, requiring
that the electoral votes counted be those given by electors who were actually
chosen, whatever the executive certificate might say. In the absence of
provision as to the second missing element, it was considered that the President of the Senate had the power to "count," and thus to determine what
electoral vote ended in a tie, or if no candidate had a majority, the House, balloting by
states, was to choose the President from the tied pair. If there were no majority, the
choice was to be from among the five highest candidates. In any case the Vice President
was to be the man who placed second. The Twelfth Amendment, in providing for
the separate election of the Vice President, preserved the power of the House over the
Presidential election and gave the Senate similar powers in the case of the Vice President. See infra, note 28.
19. THE FEDERALIST, supra, note 16, No. 59, at 392-393. Hamilton did not
discuss the electoral count or contests over the electoral vote. Id., No. 68.
20. The Act of March 1, 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239, also established the times at
which the electors were to be appointed and were to vote, as well as the date on which
Congress was to meet for the count of the vote.
21. The rise of party feeling was apparent enough by 1796 to cause outspoken
comment when a Federalist elector voted for Jefferson. STANWOOD, Op. cit. supra, note
14, at 51. While the electors retain their independence as a theoretical matter, in practice
virtually every elector ever appointed has voted at his party's call. DAVID, GOLDMAN &
BAIN, THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTIONS 222n (1960) ; cf. CORWIN,
THE PRESIDENT-OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957 40-41 (4th rev. ed. 1957). One court
has gone so far as to suggest that mandamus would lie to compel an elector to vote as
the party directed. Thomas v. Cohen, 146 Misc. 836, 262 N.Y. Supp. 320, 326 (Sup. Ct.
1933) (dictum), and the statutes of at least five states require a pledge. Wilkinson,
supra, note 7 at 254. The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that while a political
party may exact a pledge from a primary candidate, its enforceability is constitutionally
dubious. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 230 (1952) (dictum). Recent legislation in the
southern states seems to embody express recognition of the principal of independence.
CORWIN, supra, at 41; Wilkinson, supra.
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votes were to be counted.2 2 The dangers in such a system, especially when
that officer was a presidential candidate soon appeared, however, and it was
urged that Congress could by legislation provide a more satisfactory pro23
cedure.
These problems were first faced after the good will surrounding
Washington's administrations had been dissipated by strife over John Adam's
efforts to deal with the foreign and domestic consequences of the French
Revolution. In the spring of 1800 both Houses of the Federalist Congress,
24
in a last ditch effort to stem the tide of Jeffersonian Republicanism,
passed different versions of a measure under which a joint committee
was to meet prior to the count of the vote, with "power to examine
into all disputes relative to the election of President and Vice President of
the United States, other than such as might relate to the number of votes
by which the electors may have been appointed." All petitions for the
contest of electoral votes were to be referred to the Committee, which was
to take any necessary additional evidence, and make a report of its entire
proceedings, without opinion, to both Houses. Congress was then to meet
in joint session, for the count of the vote. If objection was made to the
vote of any state, the Houses were to decide it without debate in separate
session. As passed by the House the bill provided that a disputed vote was
to be counted unless the Houses concurred in rejecting it.25 The Senate,
agreeing in every provision of the bill but this one, passed an amendment
22.

Resolution of September 17, 1787, 2

RECORDS

OF THE

FEDERAL

CONVENTION,

supra, note 15, at 665-666; Counting Electoral Votes 7-8 (April 6, 1789) ; 1 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258-259 (1826) ; McKNIGHT, op. cit. supra, note 14, at
140-147, 157-167, 179-181.
23. Inl 1797 John Adams did not hesitate to count for himself the four votes of
Vermont, which apparently had been improperly cast by the state legislature. STANWOOD,
op. cit. supra, note 14, at 52. Although this act gave Adams the presidency, no objection
was raised in the counting session. Counting Electoral Votes 13, 15 (Feb. 8, 1797).
In the tied election of 1800, Jefferson, also without opposition, counted dubious votes
that gave a majority to himself and Burr. 2 DAvis, MEMOIRS OF AARON BURR 71-73
(1837) ; STANWOOD, op. cit. supra, at 69-73; Counting Electoral Votes 30 (Feb. 12,
1801). As to the idea that Congress could by legislation provide another agent for the
count, see Counting Electoral Votes 16 (Senate, Jan. 23, 1800) ; KENT, op. cit. supra,
note 22; H.R. REP. No. 31, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 84-88 (1869). Cf. 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1470 (3d ed. 1858).
24. Their purpose was to prevent the appointment of Republican electors by the

Pennsylvania legislature.
McKNIGHT,

BEVERIDGE,

THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL

op. cit. supra, note 14, at 262-269;

DOUGHERTY,

452-458 (1916);

op. cit. supra, note 2, at

62-63.

25.

Counting Electoral Votes 23, 27 (April 25, May 2, 1800). The original version

of the bill in the Senate had provided for a "Grand Committee" with a majority of its
members drawn from the Senate, having power to arrive at a binding final determination
of all disputes except those over the popular vote. Id., 21 (March 27, 1800). The
milder House version reflected the efforts of John Marshall, a somewhat more moderate
Federalist than his New England colleagues, to prevent the passage of a measure that
would have excited even greater popular ill will against his party. BEVERIDGE, op. cit.
supra, note 24.
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providing that a disputed vote was to be rejected unless the Houses concurred
in counting it. The House, less aggressively partisan than the Senate, refused
to accept a measure which would permit rejection by vote of the Senate alone.
26
The bill failed when neither House would yield.
The bill of 1800 was a measure designed to achieve partisan ends.
While it prohibited Congress from questioning a state's popular vote, it did
not bind Congress to accept a particular determination of the popular result.
Since the facts reported by the Committee were in no way made the basis of
the ultimate decision, there was not even a procedural guarantee that the
result reached by the two Houses would be based on a fair assessment of
the facts. If the bill did not provide a satisfactory means of validating a
state's votes, however, it left no doubt as to where the power to validate lay.
Even the Republican members of both Houses seemed to concede that
Congress had full power to deal with the matters over which the bill gave it
jurisdiction. 27 In light of this understanding it can be argued that the
Twelfth Amendment, the remedy for other defects appearing in the election
of 1800, embodied the view that the power to count the vote lay in Congress,
28
rather than in the President of the Senate.
No measure materially affecting the electoral count was passed in the
years prior to the Civil War 2 9 but on three occasions, Congress assumed the
power to reject the votes of a state which had not completed the formalities
necessary for admission to the Union.3 0 The only other question concerning
26. Counting Electoral Votes 28, 29 (May 8, 9, 1800).
27. In both Houses they had urged substitute measures that gave the power to
decide disputes to a majority of the joint convention. Id. 19 (Senate, March 25, 1800)
id. 26 (House, April 30, 1800).
28. The amendment did not alter the language of the original instrument regarding
the count of the vote. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. As to the changes actually made,
see supra, note 18. The amendment was passed by the Republican 8th Congress on
December 8, 1803, in a strict party line vote. 2 Stat. 306; STANWOOD, op. cit. supra,
note 14, at 77-82. The language of the act which implemented it suggests that someone
other than the President of the Senate was to count the vote. Act of March 26, 1804,
ch. 50, 2 Stat. 295. The language used in the count of 1805 indicates an understanding
that Congress was the counting authority. Counting Electoral Votes 36, 37 (Feb. 13,
1805).
29. In 1824, another year of impending crisis, the Senate passed a bill providing
that the Houses should separate to decide disputed votes, with votes to be rejected only
if the Houses concurred. The bill died in the House without being considered. Id. 57-60
(March 4-April 21, 1824). The Act of January 23, 1845, ch. 1, 5 Stat. 721, established
the present election day and permitted the states to remedy minor defects in the electoral
process. See 3 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 4 (1958).
30. In 1817 the votes of Indiana were counted after a debate in which it was
assumed that if Indiana were not a state her vote would not be counted. Counting
Electoral Votes 44-47 (Feb. 10-11, 1817). In 1821, Missouri not having complied with
the anti-slave conditions to its admission, Henry Clay put through a compromise resolution which provided that the result should be announced in alternative form, both as
though the vote of Missouri had been counted and as though it had not. Id. 48-56
(Feb. 6-14, 1821). Michigan's vote was counted in similar fashion in 1837, and the
ineligibility of certain electors was pointed out. Id. 70-76 (Jan. 26-Feb. 8, 1837). The
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the electoral vote during this period arose in 1857, when the votes of Wisconsin, unavoidably given on the wrong day, were counted after an inconclusive
debate. 31 In all four of these cases, the disputed votes had no effect on
the outcome of the election. The only consistent pattern in the debates is
32
the call for legislation to deal with the problem of the count.
Congress asserted total power over the electoral vote with the adoption
of the Twenty-second Joint Rule in 1865. Even more than the bill of 1800,
the Rule was a political measure, passed and used by Republican majorities
of both Houses to assure control over the votes of the recently rebellious
southern states. It thus contained no machinery at all for solution of disputes
on the facts. The Rule first provided for the joint meeting of the two Houses,
at which the certificates were to be opened by the President of the Senate and
read out by tellers. The critical portion was as follows:
If, upon the reading of any such certificate by the tellers, any
question shall arise in regard to counting the votes therein certified,
the same having been stated by the Presiding Officer, the Senate
shall thereupon withdraw, and the question shall be submitted to
that body for its decision; and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall in like manner state the question to the House of
Representatives for its decision; and no question shall be decided
affirmatively, and no vote objected to shall be counted, except by
the concurring vote of the two Houses, which being obtained, the
Houses shall immediately reassemble, and the Presiding Officer
shall then announce the decision of the question submitted; and
upon any such question there shall be no debate in either House.
And any other question pertinent to the object for which the two
Houses are assembled may be submitted and determined in like
manner.

33

Since concurrence
its negative, could
cause in the post
disagreement over

was required to count a disputed vote, either House, by
cause rejection. This procedure created no problem, beCivil War political climate there was little prospect of
which votes to reject.

4
The Twenty-second Joint Rule was not applied in the count of 1865.3

power of Congress to make such decisions is derived directly from its power to provide
for the admission of new states. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3. If the two Houses cannot
agree as to whether a certain entity is a state, or whether certain acts are the acts of
the lawful government of a state, no other authority can resolve the question. See
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). For the treatment of similar problems
in 1865 and 1869, see infra, notes 34, 35.
31. Counting Electoral Votes 87-144 (Feb. 11-12, 1857).
32. Id. 47 (House, Feb. 11, 1817), 52 (House, Feb. 14, 1821), 71 (Senate, Feb.
4. 1837), 129-132 (Senate, Feb. 12, 1857).
33. Id. 224 (Senate, Feb. 6, 1865). The rule was hastily passed in sparsely
attended sessions of both houses. Id. 223-226. Cf. id. 536 (March 13, 1876) (Remarks
of Senator Whyte).
34. The Twenty-second Joint Rule was only an alternative to the chief measure
upon which the Radical Republicans relied to block the votes of lately reconstructed
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In 1869, although serious questions arose, no votes were rejected under the
Rule. 35 The count of 1873, in which the Rule was applied to the votes of five
states, is the first case in which a dispute over the popular vote was
presented to Congress. 36 In four cases objection was made to the acts of the
electors and to alleged technical faults in the certificationa 7 When the votes of
Louisiana came up, Congress for the first time dealt with a "double return,"
the device with which all subsequent legislation has been designed to deal. Two
bodies in the state claimed to be the final canvassing authority. One had certified the state's Grant electors, while the other had validated a slate of Democrats, who also had the certificate of the governor. After a debate in which
members of both parties said that Congress could look to the facts of a disputed
election, in order to prevent the acceptance of a corrupt return, the Senate
Committee on Privileges and Elections was empowered to investigate the
situation. 38 The Committee found that neither canvass was valid, and held
that Congress itself could not canvass the votes without usurping the state's
constitutional powers. The Committee's report suggested, however, that it
would be proper for Congress to go behind the governor's certificate to
Louisiana and Tennessee. The Houses had previously resolved that no votes from
those two states should be counted. Id. 147-149 (House, Jan. 30, 1865) ; id. 149-223
(Senate, Feb. 1-4, 1865; House, Feb. 4, 1865). In the count of the vote this resolution,
reluctantly approved by Lincoln at the last minute, was relied on by the President of the
Senate to keep the votes of Louisiana and Tennessee from the floor. Id. 227-228 (Feb.
8, 1865). In a message received two days after the count Lincoln made it clear that he
deemed his approval of the measure unnecessary, if not improper, since Congress had
"complete power to exclude from counting all electoral votes deemed by them to be
illegal." Id. 229-230 (Senate, Feb. 10, 1865).
35. The vote of Louisiana was objected to under the Twenty-second Joint Rule
on the ground that no valid election had been held there. During the debate it appeared
that there was no evidence of any misconduct, and the Houses concurred in accepting
the questioned votes. Id. 237-244 (Feb. 10, 1869). The votes of Georgia, whose statehood was then pending before Congress, were counted under an alternative measure
similar to those used in the pre-war crises, supra, note 30. The radicals of the House
had sought to have Georgia's vote rejected altogether under the Twenty-second Joint
Rule. Outraged, they debated a censure proposal for two days after the count. Id.
231-236 (Senate, Feb. 8, 1869; House, Feb. 8, 1869) ; id. 246-266; 267-320 (House,
Feb. 11, 12, 1869). After the election an intensive and enthusiastically partisan investigation in New York City by a House Committee produced evidence of fraud which
Republican members claimed would have given the state's electoral votes to Grant.
H.R. REP. No. 31, supra, note 23.
36. In several instances between 1836 and 1872, the returns of isolated counties
had been thrown out in the state canvass for various irregularities, but no protest was
made in the count. BURNHAM, PRESIDENTIAL BALLOTS, 1836-1892 895-949 (1955).
37. Three votes from Georgia cast for Greeley, the Democratic candidate who had
died after the election, were rejected on the vote of the House, the Senate voting to
accept them. Id. 368, 377 (Feb. 12, 1873). Objections on various technical grounds to
the votes of Texas and Mississippi were denied by both Houses. Id. 369-371, 380, 383,
386-389. Arkansas's votes for Grant were rejected by the Senate for lack of a seal,
suggesting that the Republicans were seeking to create an impression of fairness. Id.
402. It later appeared that Arkansas had no seal at the time of the election. Cf. id.
510 (Feb. 25, 1875) (Remarks of Senator Logan).
38. Counting Electoral Votes 336-345 (Senate, Jan. 7, 1873).
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determine whether a legal canvass had been made.a9 In the count proceedings
this report was not mentioned, but objections based on its facts were made
40
and both sets of votes were rejected by concurrent vote.
Under the Twenty-second Joint Rule Congress not only claimed the
power to count, but defined that power as permitting it to reject an invalid
state canvass. As in 1800, however, Congress would not undertake to decide
for itself which electors had actually been appointed. Moreover, the makeshift fact-finding provisions relied upon were effective only because the state
contest was not material to the outcome of the national election. The solution that was reached may have been just, as far as it went, but it left unresolved the question of who actually carried Louisiana.
Between 1873 and 1876 Congress tried vainly to pass permanent legislation to regulate the electoral count. A bill drafted by Senator Oliver P.
Morton of Indiana passed the Senate in February 1875,'41 but the House
failed to act upon it. The bill was in essence the Twenty-second Joint Rule,
with a provision that a single return from a state could not be rejected unless
both Houses concurred in the action, but that in case of a double return, no
vote could be counted unless both Houses concurred. Brief debate was
permitted in the separate sessions of the Houses, but an amendment creating
a committee to find the facts was rejected. 42 Since any serious contest
would present a double return the bill gave no greater guarantee of a nonpolitical decision than did the Rule. When the 44th Congress convened in
December 1875, the House was Democratic for the first time since before
the Civil War. 43 In this situation the Senate did not re-adopt the Twentysecond Joint Rule, in effect repealing it. 4 4 The Morton bill was brought up
again in an effort to fill the gap, but members of both parties apparently felt
39. Id. 358-363 (Senate, Feb. 10, 1873).

The Republican returning board had

been upheld by the state supreme court, but the majority voted to ignore this fact, since
the decision came after the meeting of the electors. Id. 362. See State ex rel. Attorney
General v. Wharton, 25 La. Ann. 2 (1873).
40. Counting Electoral Votes 399, 406 (Feb. 10, 1873).
41. Id. 519 (Feb. 25, 1875). Prior efforts to pass a Constitutional Amendment
giving Congress "power to provide for holding and conducting the elections of President
and Vice President and to establish tribunals for the decision of such elections as
may be contested," had been unsuccessful. Id. 345-357 (Senate, Jan. 17, 1873), 408-444
(May 28, 1874, Jan. 21-27, 1875). A proposal to change the Twenty-second Joint Rule
to provide that concurrence was necessary for rejection also failed. Id. 444-458 (Feb.
4, 1875).
42. S. 1251, 43 Cong., 2d Sess., id. 459 (Feb. 25, 1875). The amendment was
thought too great a delegation of the congressional power over the count. Id. 480-487,
498-499. An amendment to eliminate the broad language of the Twenty-second Joint
Rule, supra, note 33, permitting decision of "any other question," was passed, in order
that the bill would not be construed as covering questions over which Congress had no
jurisdiction, such as the determination of state contests. Id. 463.
43. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES

692 (1960)
44.

[Hereinafter cited

HISTORICAL STATISTICS].

Counting Electoral Votes 786-787 (Jan. 20, 1876).

19611

THE ELECTORAL VOTE

that the time was not ripe for a measure which would permit the action of
one House to control the other. The bill was laid aside for good in August
1876." 5 The nation thus faced the election of 1876 with no machinery for
resolving disputes over the electoral vote. Perhaps both sides expected a
close fight and neither wished to put into effect a plan which might work to
its disadvantage.
All such expectations were more than justified in the election of 1876,
which resulted in the Hayes-Tilden controversy, the one great test of our
electoral system.46 In no other election have disputed electoral votes been
sufficient to affect the outcome. On this occasion Tilden, the Democratic
candidate, could win either by picking up one of twenty contested votes or
by prevailing in an election in the Democratic House. Unless Hayes won
all of the contested votes, he would lose the presidency. In the count the
chief problem was presented by double returns from Florida, Louisiana, and
South Carolina, where Republican returning boards, claiming that the Democrats had used force and fraud among the Negro voters, had thrown out
sufficient Tilden votes to carry the states for Hayes. Questions were also
raised as to the eligibility of certain Hayes electors in Florida and Louisiana,
and in Oregon, where the Democratic governor had certified a Tilden elector
in place of the ineligible Republican. To resolve the controversy, a bi-partisan
majority of both Houses passed an act 4 7 creating the Electoral Commission,
a body with "the same powers, if any, now ... possessed by the two Houses,"
to take evidence upon and arrive at a decision of the disputes. In the joint
session for the count, single returns were to be dealt with as in the Morton
Bill. 48 Questions involving double returns were to be sent to the Commission.
Its decision was to be binding upon Congress in the count, unless rejected
by the vote of both Houses.
The composition of the Commission reflected a game but unsuccessful
attempt to attain impartiality. It consisted of five Senators, five Representatives, and five Justices of the Supreme Court. In this group there were seven
45. Id. 519-520, 676-687 (Senate, March 13, April 19, Aug. 5, 1876).
46. For fuller treatment of the controversy, see HAWORTH, THE HAYES-TILDEN
ELECTION (2d ed. 1927); DOUGHERTY, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 105-213; NEVINS,
ABRAM S. HEWITT 305-399 (1935) ; WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION (1951);
Lewis, The Hayes-Tilden ElcctioI Contest, 47 A.B.A.J. 36, 163 (1961). The proceedings of the Electoral Commission are found in 5 CONG. REC., part 4 (1877), a separately
paged supplement to the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD [Hereinafter cited as 5(4) CONG. REC.].
See also U.S. CONGRESS, ELECTORAL COMMISSION, ELECTORAL COUNT OF 1877 (1877).
47. Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, 19 Stat. 227. For a summary of the debates on
the Act, see DOUGHERTY, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 110-135. The committee deliberations
that led to the acceptance

of the measure are documented in NEVINS,

op. cit. su1pra,

note 46, at 342-364.
48. During the count single returns from Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin were objected to on eligibility grounds. All were accepted, either by concurrent vote or by the vote of the Senate. 5 CONG. REC. 1720, 1728,
1938, 1945, 2054, 2068 (1877).
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Democrats and an equal number of avowed Republicans. The fifteenth man,
:a Justice to be chosen by the other four Justices, was to be the neutral
'balance. After Mr. Justice Davis, an independent, thankfully declined the
'honor in somewhat dubious circumstances, 49 it fell upon Mr. Justice Bradley,
:aRepublican, who seemed to the Democrats the next most likely to decide
.impartially. Whether for partisan reasons, or because he saw the issues that
,way, Bradley consistently voted with the Republicans, giving Hayes an
(eight-man majority on every important question before the Commission.
-As a result, the view that the decision was at least influenced, if not
,corrupted, by political considerations was widely held at the time and seems
(difficult to avoid today.50
The main issue before the Commission was its power (and thus the
power of Congress) to go behind a state's own determination of the results
of the popular election, as reflected in the findings of the returning board, duly
certified by the governor. It seems clear, that whatever acts of violence the
Democrats may have committed, in the three southern states, the Republican
boards, in throwing out votes wholesale, had exceeded even the broad powers
which reconstruction statutes had given them.5' The Democrats argued that
49. Davis was unexpectedly chosen by the Illinois legislature to fill a vacancy in
the United States Senate. It is unclear whether this transpired through Democratic
stupidity or Republican cleverness. See NEVINS, op. cit. supra, note 46, at 361-367.
50. The letters of Mr. Justice Miller, avowedly a Republican, leave little doubt
that he was heavily in favor of Hayes and greatly relieved by the outcome. FAIRMAN,
MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890 280-291 (1939).
For the
torrent of abuse to which Mr. Justice Bradley was subjected both before and after
the proceedings, see Klinkhamer, Joseph P. Bradley: Private and Public Opinion of a
"Political" Justice, 38 U. OF DET. L.J. 150 (1960). The role of the five justices in the
controversy increased public criticism of the opinion of the Court in the Granger
Cases (Munn v. Illinois), 94 U.S. 113, handed down on March 1, 1877. 2 WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 583 (Rev. ed. 1926). For more
recent views, see NEVINS, op. cit. supra, note 46, at 370-373, 378n; FAIRMAN, op. Cit.
supra, at 292; WOODWARD, op. cit. supra, note 46, at 155-163.
51. The applicable Florida statute provided that the Board of State Canvassers
might throw out any returns which appeared so false and fraudulent that the Board
could not determine the true vote. Acts and Resolutions of Fla. 1872, ch. 1868, § 4. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.131 (1960). The Board had taken testimony regarding alleged
offenses and had thrown out numerous individual votes. In the gubernatorial contest the
state supreme court ruled this action illegal, holding that the statute gave the Board
discretion to look only to the bona fides of the returns, not to the votes themselves. State
ex rel. Drew v. Board of State Canvassers, 16 Fla. 17 (1877). In Louisiana the statute
set up an elective returning board. If sworn complaints regarding fraud or violence at
the polls were made to it, the board could investigate the charges and exclude from
the count any return which it found materially affected by these influences. Acts of
La. 1872, No. 98. § 3. Without complying with these formalities, the board had thrown
out some 13,000 Democratic votes. 5(4) CONG. REC. 60-61. The South Carolina statute
gave the State Canvassing Board power to decide "cases under protest or contest." S.C.
REV. STAT. tit. 2, § 26 (1873).
See S.C. CODE § 23-476 (1952). The Board had
refused to entertain Democratic allegations of fraud in certain of the county canvasses. 5(4) CONG. REC. 180. For the unsuccessful efforts of the South Carolina
Democrats in the state courts, see State ex rel. Barker v. Bowen, 8 S.C. 382 (1876)
Id. 400 (1877).
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pursuant to the national interest in a true result, the Commission should look
to the facts of the election and find that the Tilden electors had been appointed. In the alternative they urged that, as in the case of Louisiana in
1873, there were no valid returns from the states in question. These arguments failed to persuade the Republican majority of the Commission, which
held by an eight to seven vote in each case that it was bound by the certificates
based on results reached by the validly constituted state returning boards
and would look to no evidence of the facts of the election. 52 The Commission also held that it had power to look into eligibility only if ineligibility at
the time of voting were alleged. In the case of Oregon it made clear that
the unchallenged result reached by the returning board could not be overruled by the governor's certificate. 53 In denying that it had power to go
behind the returns, the majority was careful to leave open the possibility
that Congress might provide by law some proper means for determining such
questions.

54

The decision of the Commission was accepted by the Senate in each
case and so was binding in the count in spite of rejection by the House. The
more eager Democratic partisans threatened to prolong the proceedings past
the end of Grant's term on March 4, but other forces were working for
compromise. Those who honestly feared civil tumult worked with those who
saw the chance for personal advantage in a series of desparate negotiations
that finally persuaded a majority of the House to desist, in time for Hayes
to be declared elected on March 2.15
Congress had again taken control of the power to validate electoral
votes, but Democratic hopes that the validation would be based on the
merits of the individual controversies were illusory. The Commission not
only refused to make impartial findings of fact, but allowed itself to be bound
by the findings of partisan state agencies that were the source of the dispute.
In spite of its judicial trappings, the Commission was a political body, an
arm of Congress, and so it reached a partisan result. This result did not
itself resolve the great controversy. It rather provided a medium for political
compromise. The legal arguments involved had merit on both sides and
52. 5(4) CONG. REc. 56, 119, 192. In the case of Florida the Commission further
held invalid the certificate of the newly elected Democratic governor based on a state
quo warranto proceeding completed subsequent to the date of meeting of the electors.
In Louisiana it decided that a group of Democrats claiming to be the returning board
was not authorized to act as such. In South Carolina it rejected Democratic arguments
based on the failure of the state to enact a registration statute required by its constitution
and on alleged federal interference in the election. Ibid. See generally, DOUGHERTY,

op. cit. supra, note 2, at 136-183, 202-207.
53. 5(4) CONG. REc. 38, 57, 117, 119, 179.
153, 160, 180, 184-202.
54.
55.

DOUGHERTY,

op. cit. supra, note 2, at

5(4) CONG. REc. 56, 192; cf. Id. 263-264 (Opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley).
5 CONG. REC. 2068 (1877). The story of the negotiations is told in full detail in
WOODWARD, op. cit. supra, note 46. See also, NEVINS, op. cit. supra, note 46, at 379-399.
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would have divided Congress unalterably on political lines. The Commission
prevented such a split by reaching a result which one House was bound to accept. A House compromise could then be reached without loss of face on either
side. Considering the potential for civil disturbance which underlay the
Hayes-Tilden controversy, an acceptable political solution was of great importance. Crisis might have been avoided altogether, however, if there had
already been in effect a provision for fair determination of state controversies
on the merits.
The Hayes-Tilden decision marked the end of a fifteen-year period of
national crisis, but it did not halt congressional efforts to pass legislation
that would solve the problems made manifest in 1877. The bill which finally
became the Electoral Count Act was introduced by Senator Edmunds of
Vermont in May 1878.56 Spurred by two close presidential elections, 5 7 the
Senate passed the bill three times in the next decade, but each time could
not win the agreement of the House. 8 Finally, in 1887, when the passions
of Reconstruction had cooled, the Republican Senate and Democratic House
of the 49th Congress were able to pass a compromise measure in an atmosphere relatively free of partisan pressures.5 9
The Electoral Count Act as introduced in 1878 and passed in 1887
56. S. 1308, 45th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 CONG. REc. 3739. Cf. Edmunds, Presidewtial
Elections, 12 AM. L. REV. 1, 15-19 (1877).
57. Garfield defeated Hancock in 1880 by only 7,368 votes out of some 9,000,000
cast, and won in the Electoral College by 214 votes to 155. In 1884 Cleveland's popular
vote lead was some 68,000 out of 9,500,000, but his electoral vote lead was a mere 37.
He carried New York with its 36 electoral votes by a plurality of only 1167 out of
nearly, 1,200,000 votes. HISTORICAL STATISTICS 682-683, 689. Cf. BURNHAM, op. cit. supra,
note 36, at 130, 137. As to the counts in 1880 and 1884, see infra, note 58.
58. S. 1308, supra, note 56, passed the Republican Senate in December 1878,
but was allowed to die in the still Democratic House. 8 CONG. REC. 51-54, 68-74, 157170, 197 (1878). In the 46th Congress, with both Houses Democratic, efforts to pass
legislation to control the count of 1881 failed, and a compromise was adopted, providing
for the alternative count of the votes of Georgia, which had been cast on the wrong day.
STANWOOD, op. cit. supra, note 14, at 399; 11 CONG. REC. 19-32, 39-48, 61-73, 132-134
(1880). The count proceeded peacefully under this device. Id. 1386-1387 (1881). The
bill reappeared in the Republican 47th Congress as S. 613. 13 CONG. REc. 859, 26512652 (1882). It died in the House, after an unsuccessful effort to amend it to provide
that the losing candidate might contest the election in federal court after the President
of the Senate had declared the result. Id. 5142-5150. On its next appearance the bill
passed a Republican Senate for the third time. S. 25, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 CONG.
REC. 430, (1883).
The House, again Democratic, passed a substitute giving decision
of all questions to a per capita vote of the joint session, which was unacceptable to
the Senate. Id. 5460-5468, 5547-5551 (1884) ; 16 Id. 1618 (1885). As in 1876, neither
party would give ground in an election year, but the count of the vote in 1885 passed
without incident. Id. 1532. As to the composition of Congress, see HISTORICAL STATISTICS
692.
59. S. 9, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. It was introduced in the form in which it had last
passed the Senate. 17 CONG. REc. 122, 242 (1885). After a brief debate, a substitute
was reported back. Id. 1021, 1057-1064, 2387 (1886). This version passed the Senate
without amendment. Id. 2427-2430. Numerous amendments were added in the House,
and the final form of the bill was the result of a conference. 18 CONG. REC. 29-31, 4552, 77 (1886) ; 668 (1887).
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involved one significant change from the plan of the Morton Bills of 187576. If a state provided for the determination of contests over the electoral
vote, the result of any proceeding under such a provision was to be binding
on Congress in the count. Only in the failure of such a determination was
Congress to have the power to reject votes. In its report in December 1886,
the House Select Committee on the Election of President and Vice President
described the effect of the proposed legislation:
The bill provides the means of determining what is the vote,
how it shall be counted, its count, and the authoritative declaration
of the result.
The two Houses are by the Constitution authorized to make
the count of the electoral votes. They can only count legal votes,
and in doing so must determine from the best evidence to be had,
what are legal votes; and if they cannot agree upon which are legal
votes, then the state which has failed to bring itself under the
plain provisions of the bill and failed to provide for the determination
of all questions by her own authorities will lose her vote.
Congress having provided by this bill that the State tribunals
may determine what votes are legal coming from that State, and that
it will be
the two Houses shall be bound by this determination,
60
the State's own fault if the matter is left in doubt.
The great problems of the first century of our electoral system seemed
solved. A measure had finally been passed providing for a fair determination
of the facts of individual contests that would be binding upon Congress in
the count. The national interest in a true result was thus vindicated without
offense to state control of the process of appointment. While Congress
claimed full power to validate votes, its role was limited to cases in which
a state had failed to settle its own disputes and to questions beyond state
competence. If the Act worked in practice, no dispute could again disrupt the
orderly process of a presidential election.
The pertinent provisions of the Electoral Count Act as presently found
in the United States Code 61 are as follows:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the
day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of
all or any of the electors of such State, by judicial or other methods
or procedures, and such determination shall have been made at least
six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such
60. H.R. REP. No. 1638, 49th Cong., 2d Sess., 18 CONG. REC. 30 (1886).

61. Act of February 3, 1887, ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373, 3 U.S.C. §§ 5-7, 15-18 (1958).
Technical changes were made by the Act of October 19, 1888, ch. 1216, 25 Stat. 613,
and by the Act of May 29, 1928, ch. 859, 45 Stat. 945. For later changes, see infra,
notes 63, 76. The Act, prior provisions still in effect, so4ra, notes 20 and 29, and
subsequent changes were codified as 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-20 (1958), by Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 644, § 1, 62 Stat. 672.
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determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said day,
and made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the
electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter
regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by
62
such State is concerned.
Congress is to meet in joint session in the House at one P.M. on
January 6th for the count of the vote, with the President of the Senate in
the chair. The latter is to open "all the certificates and papers purporting
to be certificates of the electoral votes," in alphabetical order by states and
hand them to tellers who are to read them out.
Upon such reading of any such certificate or paper, the President of the Senate shall call for objections, if any. Every objection
shall be made in writing, and shall state clearly and concisely,
and without argument, the ground thereof, and shall be signed
by at least one Senator and one member of the House of Representatives before the same shall be received. When all objections made
to any vote or paper from a State shall have been received and
read, the Senate shall thereupon withdraw, and such objections
shall be submitted to the Senate for its decision; and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives shall, in like manner, submit
such objections to the House of Representatives for its decision;
and no electoral vote or votes from any State which shall have been
regularly given by electors whose appointment has been lawfully
certified to according to Section 6 of this title63 from which but one
return has been received shall be rejected, but the two Houses
concurrently may reject the vote or votes when they agree that such
vote or votes have not been so regularly given by electors whose
appointment has been so certified. If more than one return or paper
purporting to be a return from a State shall have been received by
the President of the Senate, those votes, and those only, shall be
counted which shall have been regularly given by the electors who
are shown by the determination mentioned in Section 5 of this title"
to have been appointed, if the determination in said section provided
for shall have been made ... but in case there shall arise the question
which of two or more of such State authorities determining what
62. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1958).
63. Id. § 6 provides that the executive of each state, "as soon as practicable after the
conclusion of the appointment of the electors in such State by the final ascertainment,
under and in pursuance of the laws of such State providing for such ascertainment," is
to mail a certificate of the electors appointed and the number of votes to the Administrator of General Services. Copies of this certificate are also given to the electors, who
forward them with the certificates of their votes. Supra, note 10. If there is a subsequent determination of a controversy under 3 U.S.C. § 5, supra, note 62, evidence of it
is to be forwarded in similar fashion. As to the role of the Administrator of General
Services, see 107 CONG. REC. 265 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1961) (Remarks of Senator Russell).
This function was transferred from the Secretary of State as part of the reorganization
of 1950. Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, §§ 4-9, 65 Stat. 711.
64. Supra, note 62.
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electors have been appointed, as mentioned in Section 5 of this title,
is the lawful tribunal of such State, the votes regularly given of
those electors, and those only, of such State shall be counted whose
title as electors the two Houses, acting separately, shall concurrently
decide is supported by the decision of such State so authorized by
its law; and in such case of more than one return or paper purporting to be a return from a State, if there shall have been no such
determination of the question in the State aforesaid, then those
votes, and those only, shall be counted which the two Houses
shall concurrently decide were cast by lawful electors appointed in
accordance with the laws of the State, unless the two Houses, acting
separately, shall concurrently decide such votes not to be the lawful
votes of the legally appointed electors of such State. But if the two
Houses shall disagree in respect of the counting of such votes,
then, and in that case, the votes of the electors whose appointment
shall have been certified by the executive of the State under the seal
thereof, shall be counted. 65
A survey of the sessions of Congress called to count the vote under the
Electoral Count Act shows that prior to 1961 no question was presented at
any count that might have called any of these provisions into play.6 6 It is
thus necessary to look closely at the language of the Act and its legislative
history in order to understand its operation and effect in dealing with the
problems of single and double returns so familiar to its drafters.
(1) Single Returns. If those who wish to contest the vote of a state
have not sent forward a paper purporting to be a certificate of the electoral
votes which they urge to be the correct ones, then the return which Congress
has received is given virtually binding effect. The intention here was to
insure that the election result reached by proper state authority would not be
questioned in Congress if it were unchallenged in the State. Even in such a
case, however, Congress must have power to see that the state governor has
certified the results actually reached in the state canvass, and to deal with
any irregularity in the acts of the electors.6 7 By concurrent action the
Houses may thus reject even votes in a single return that they find not
65. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). The Act also provides for brief recesses during the
count, id. § 16; for a maximum of two hours of debate in separate session, with each
speaker limited to five minutes, id. § 17; and in joint session for no debate and consideration of no other question except a motion to withdraw, id. § 18.
66. In the count of 1889 there was some confusion, but no actual problems were
present. 20 CONG. REC. 1859-1860. For the subsequent counts, see 3 HINDS' PRECEDENTS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, §§ 1960-1963 (1907) ; 6 Cannon's Precedents of
the House of Representatives, §§ 442-446 (1935) ; 81 CONG. REC. 83 (1937) ; 87 id. 43
(1941) ; 91 id. 90 (1945) ; 95 id. 89 (1949) ; 99 id.130 (1953) ; 103 id. 294 (1957). The
procedure presently followed has been purely a formal ritual for many years. See
Cannon's Procedure in the House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 122, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., 193-196 (1959).

67. See 8

CONG. REC.

54 (1878)

(Remarks of Senator Edmunds); 18

CONG.

REC. 30-31 (1887) (Remarks of Mr. Caldwell); id. 49 (Remarks of Mr. Eden) ; id.
668 (1887) (Report of Conference Committee).
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"regularly given by electors whose appointment has been lawfully certified
to" by the executive authority of the state under the terms of the Act.
The power of Congress over a single return is carefully limited to these
two areas, but even in carrying out this mandate, difficult problems of
interpretation could arise. Presumably votes "regularly given" are given in
accordance with the requirements of the Constitution as to time and form.
The language undoubtedly also means that the electors have acted without
mistake or fraud. Does it have the further meaning that they have voted
for an eligible candidate? Likewise, votes "lawfully certified to" would seem
to be votes certified to in accordance with the terms of the Act. Presumably
the phrase also extends to a case in which the governor has certified electors
other than those shown to have been elected by the state canvass, as in the
case of Oregon in 1877. Could Congress look further under this provision
and refuse to accept a governor's certificate based on a canvass illegally made?
Does a vote cast by an ineligible elector otherwise properly certified to,
who is ineligible to the office of elector fall within either of these categories
upon which Congress may act? These unanswered questions could lead to
the arbitrary congressional action which the Act sought to avoid.
(2) Double Returns. Since a return need only "purport" to be a certificate of the vote to merit consideration under the Act, in any serious
contest, double returns will be presented. There are four situations which
may arise.
(a) Final Determination by Appropriate State Authorities. The state
contest provision was considered the central provision of the Act. Since
the result of a contest was to be absolutely binding upon Congress as to the
identity of the electors,6s a return so validated would be counted if otherwise proper. The Act requires that only votes "regularly given" must be
counted. The implication seems clear that votes not meeting this standard
could be rejected as in the case of a single return, 60 and the problems of
interpretation in that case would again be present.
Unfortunately the contest provisions present such difficulties, both of
interpretation and application, that in the great majority of cases they will
not apply. In the first place there is another problem of definition. Although
the language of the Act was intended to give the states the broadest latitude
to provide for the final determination of contests by any means-judicial or
otherwise-only 19 states have passed contest legislation expressly dealing
68. 8 CONG. REC. 52 (1878) (Remarks of Senator Edmunds). In the course of
the debates in 1882, the Senate rejected an amendment that would have given the two
Houses power to overturn the state determination by concurrent vote. The proponents
of the bill made it clear that they deemed the state's determination to be absolutely
binding. 13 CONG. REC. 2651-2652. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1638, supra, note 60.
69. 8 CONG. REC. 54 (1878) (Remarks of Senator Edmunds) ; 18 CONG. REc. 31
(1886) (Remarks of Mr. Caldwell).
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with presidential electors in any way.70 In the remaining states a variety of
provisions exist which deal generally with election contests.

71

In these states

70. As to the legislative intent, see 17 CONG. REC. 2387, 2427 (1886). In five
states the legislature has provided a special contest proceeding in an existing court.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-14-1, 49-14-2 (1953) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-315,
9-323 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 5921-5928 (1953) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch.
54, §§ 119-120 (1953) ; S.D. CODE, §§ 16.1902-1914 (1939). In two states a special court
has been established. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 60.1-60.6 (1949) ; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 16-0616-15 (1960). hi two states express provision is made for trial in the manner decreed for
contests for other offices. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 518, 392 (1955), 391 (Supp.
1960) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 3291, 3351-3352, 3456-3475 (1938). The legislature
of one state has provided that it shall determine all contests for the office of elector.
VERNONS ANN. MO. STAT. § 128.100 (1952). Three states have provided for final
determination of contests by the canvassing authority. KANS. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 251433

(1949) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-22-4 (1956);

VERNON'S ANN. TEX. STAT.

ELECTION CODE, § 9.29 (1952). In two other states there are similar provisions, but
court decisions cast doubt on their finality. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 5 § 50 (1954)
(See Rounds v. Smart, 71 Me. 380 (1880)); cf. infra, note 71; S.C. CODE §§ 23-475,
23-476 (1952) (See Redfearn v. Board of State Canvassers, 234 S.C. 113, 107 S.E.2d
10 (1959)). In two states the provisions specifically applicable to electors are not
the exclusive form of contest. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 102-121, 131 ; 99.192-221
(1960) (See in!ra, note 71) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:94-98, 68:1-11 (1955) (See
infra, note 71). Two southern states have passed identical legislation giving to a
special board broad powers over the electoral vote which might be construed to include
final power to determine contests. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-327 (Supp. 1959) ; GA. CODE
ANN. § 34-2515

(Supp. 1960).

If the Arkansas provision does not apply, then contests

would be tried as for supreme court judge. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-313 (1947).

In

Georgia the contest provisions for members of the General Assembly would govern.

GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-2101, 2901, 2801-2803 (1936). One proposal for legislation to
implement the Twenty-third Amendment, giving the District of Columbia the presidential vote, would provide both a recount and a special contest proceeding in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Washington Star, April 2, 1961,
§ 1, p. 7; cf. S. 1883, 87 Cong., 1st Sess., 107 CONG. REC. 7478-9 (daily ed. May
16, 1961).
71. hi 17 states provision has been made for the contest in the state courts of election to "any office," "any public office," "any state office," or a similar variation. ALASKA
Sess. Laws 1960, ch. 83, §§ 4.71-4.93; ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-1201-1207 (1956);
CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 8510-8575; FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 99.192-99.221 (1960) (See
supra, note 70) ; HAWAII REV. LAWS

§§ 23.19-30 (1944;

§§

11-85.1-.5 (Supp. 1960) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46,

Supp. 1960); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 122.070-090 (1955);

MD. ANN.

CODE art. 33, §§ 145-146 (1957; Supp. 1960) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 209.02-209.10 (Pamphlet Supp. 1959) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 23-1459-1467 (1955) ; NEv. REV. STAT.

§§ 296.505-515 (1959) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:29-1-29-11 (1940) ; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 3-9-1-3-9-10 (1953) ; N.Y. ELECTION LAW §§ 330-333, cf. N.Y. CIVIL PRACT.
ACT §§ 1208-1221; OHIO REV. CODE §§ 3515.08-.15 (Baldwin, 1960) ; ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 251.025-.090 (1957) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20-15-1--15-12 (1953). Two states provide
for such contests in the legislature. IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, §§ 5601-5617 (1949) ; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-99 (1952). The general contest provisions of the remaining states do
not extend to presidential electors, but all of these states provide an action in quo warranto against one who "usurps, intrudes into or unlawfully holds or exercises any public
office."

In 11 of the states there is little doubt that a lack in the general contest pro-

visions is to be supplied by a quo warranto proceeding. ALA. CODE tit. 17, §§ 231, 254
(1959), id. tit. 7, §§ 1136-1155 (1960) (Provision that no election triable under the Code
may be tried by quo warranto is to be strictly construed. Walker v. Junior, 247 Ala. 342,

24 So. 2d 431 (1946)) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 34-2001-2011, 6-602-609 (1948) (See Tiegs
v. Patterson, 79 Idaho 365 318 P.2d 588 (1957)) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 129, §§ 21,
22 (1954) (Common law right of action preserved) (See supra, note 70) ; MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 27.2315-2326 (1938), 6.1861-1892 (1956) (Statutory recount proceeding does
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the courts would first have to decide whether they had jurisdiction in a
contest involving electors. 72 If a state court took jurisdiction, Congress
would then face two questions: (1) Does the language of the Electoral Count
Act include contest provisions which do not specifically deal with electors?
(2) If the state result is otherwise binding, is it the "final determination"
envisioned by the Act? The Act does not provide for the decision of such
questions. There seem to be grounds for argument that concurrence would
be required to reject a state determination on these grounds, as in the case
of a single return, but the question is open.
Problems of definition aside, there is a further difficulty in the time
provisions of the Act. In Edmund's original bill a state determination
made at any time prior to the date of the meeting of the electors would
bind Congress. To insure that contests would be completed, the electors
were to be appointed on the first Tuesday in October and were not to meet
until the first Monday in January. 73 In the Act as passed, although a November election day was retained and the requirement that a state determination be made at least six days prior to the meeting of the electors was added, 74
not abridge common law right) ; Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 1120-1145, 3287-3290 (1956)
(Quo warranto lies in cases not covered by election contest provisions. Kelly v. State er
rel. Kiersky, 79 Miss. 168, 30 So. 49 (1901) ; Warren v. State exr rel. Barnes, 163 Miss.
187, 141 So. 901 (1932)) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 491.7 (Supp. 1960) (Common law
right of action preserved. Stickney v. Salem, 96 N.H. 500, 78 A.2d 921 (1951) (See
supra, note 70) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1901-2017, 23-2801-2821 (1955) (Provision that
no election triable under the Code may be tried by quo warranto is designed to insure
that there be only one contest proceeding. State e.r rel. Anderson v. Gossett, 77 Tenn.
644 (1882)); Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4041-4045 (1958), tit. 17, §§ 1361-1365 (1959)
(See State ex tel. Ballard v. Greene, 87 Vt. 515, 89 Atl. 743 (1914)) ; WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 29.65.010-.130 (1951), WASH. REV CODE ANN. §§ 7.56.010-.100 (1961) (See State ex
tel. Holt v. Hamilton, 118 Wash. 91, 202 Pac. 971 (1921)) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 6.66
(1957), 294.01-.13 (1958) (See State ex rel. Dithmar v. Bunnell, 131 Wis. 198, 110 N.W.
177 (1907)); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-296, 22-306-324 (1957), 1-896-929 (1959) (See
State x tel. Walton v. Christmas, 48 Wyo. 239, 44 P.2d 905 (1935)). In the remaining
four states serious doubts exist as to whether the writ would lie in an election contest.
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:1251, 42:76-85 (1951) ; NEBR. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,121-21,134
(1956), 32-1001-1034 (960) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-419-434 (1950), 8-857-865 (1957);
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 193-207, 5310-5316 (1955). As to quo warranto generally, see
MCCRARY, AMERICAN LAW OF ELECTIONS §§ 393-395, 425 (4th ed. 1897).
72. This question in most cases would turn on the definition of the term "public"
or "state" office in the applicable statute. The United States Supreme Court has held
that electors are "state officers" in denying habeas corpus in a conviction under state
law for vote fraud in a presidential election. In re Green, 134 U.S. 377 (1890). Interpretation in state courts has varied from case to case, however, according to the
intention of the legislature. Conpare State v. Mountjoy, 83 Mont. 162, 271 Pac. 446
(1928), with Spreckels v. Graham, 194 Cal. 516, 228 Pac. 1040 (1924) ; Harless v. Lockwood, 85 Ariz. 97, 332 P.2d 887 (1958), with Lane v. Melamore, 169 S.W. 1073 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1914) ; cf. Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1320 (1959). See also Smith v. Ruth, 308 Ky.
60, 212 S.W.2d 532 (1948) ; Lillard v. Cordell, 200 Okla. 577, 198 P.2d 417 (1948).
73. 8 CONG. REC. 51 (1878).
74. In the third version of the bill, S. 25, supra, note 58, Senator Hoar, floor
manager, insisted that it was unchanged from its previous passage in the Senate, but the
six-day requirement was in the version taken up by the House. 15 CON. REc. 430,
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contests were still practicable, because the electoral meeting was to be on the
second Monday in January.75 When the Twentieth Amendment changed
Inauguration Day from March 4 to January 20, the legislation enacted to
implement it made a corresponding change in these provisions.76 The electors
now are to meet on the Monday after the second Wednesday in December,
only 40 days after they are appointed. In order to be of binding effect, a
contest must be completed six days prior to that date, a mere 34 days after
the election.
In only two states are the election contest provisions certain to produce
a final result within this short period." In the rest, finality would depend
on a number of factors, such as the diligence of the contestant, the success
of his opponent with delaying tactics, the number of votes questioned, and
the time limitations of the contest procedure.
The aftermath of the 1960 election highlights the time problem. In
Hawaii the official count of the popular vote showed that Mr. Nixon had
carried the state by a mere 141 votes out of some 184,000 cast. 78 In the
latter part of November the Democratic electors petitioned in the circuit
court for a recount, which was allowed on December 13th, over the protest
of the State Attorney General that federal law required a decision six days
prior to the meeting of the electors. 79 Both sets of electors met on the
appointed day, December 19, 1960, and cast their votes. The governor of
Hawaii gave his certificate to the Republican electors. On December 30,
1960, the court handed down its decree, finding that the Kennedy electors
had prevailed by 115 votes. On January 4, 1961, the governor forwarded to
the Administrator of General Services a copy of the court decree and his
revised certificate, validating the Democrats. ° In the counting session the
certificate of the Republican electors with its validation by the governor, the
certificate of the Democratic electors, and the governor's revised certificate
were all presented. After ascertaining that there was no objection, Mr.
5076 (1884). Amendments to eliminate the provision from the final version of the bill,
S. 9, supra, note 59, were rejected in the House. 18 CONG. REC. 77 (1886).

75. 24 Stat. 373.
76. Act of June 5, 1934, ch. 390, §§ 6-7, 48 Stat. 879. The Twentieth Amendment
altered Inauguration Day to January 20th, and the first meeting of the new Congress
to January 3d. The Act, in providing that the counting session should be on January 6th,
insured that the count would not be made by a lame-duck Congress.
77. The statutes of Connecticut and Iowa, supra, note 70, expressly provide that
a result is to be reached prior to the deadline in the federal statute.
78. N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1960, p. 28, col. 2 (city ed.).
79. Lum v. Bush, Civil No. 7029, Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit. See
N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1960, p. 29, col. 7 (city ed.) ; id. Dec. 2, 1960, p. 17, col. 6; id.
Dec. 15, 1960, p. 39, col. 1; 107 CONG. REc. 282-3 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1961). See Hawaii's
contest statute, supra, note 71.
80. For the various certificates, the court decree, and the governor's letter of
explanation, see ibid. The governor noted that the time for appeal would not expire
until January 9th, but that no appeal was planned. Id. 282.
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Nixon, presiding as Vice President, accepted the revised determination, with
a careful statement that he was not to be considered as setting a precedent. 8'
With the best will in the world the contestants in Hawaii were not able to
reach a result until seventeen days after the deadline set in the Act. If
Hawaii's three votes could have affected Mr. Kennedy's lead, Republican
objections to the acceptance of the decree as binding would have been
sound, whatever their fate in a Democratic Congress.
In Illinois, where Mr. Kennedy had prevailed by 8900 votes out of
4Y2 million cast, Republicans launched a vigorous campaign to uncover vote
frauds in heavily Democratic Cook County and carry the state's 27 electoral
votes for Mr. Nixon.12 Amidst charges and counter-charges, they soon
discovered that even without hindrance from Democratic election officials,
it would be impossible to achieve a result in time. 3 They then urged that
there was sufficient evidence of fraud that the State Election Board could
refuse to certify the Democratic electors. 4 After maximum delay the Board,
which was four-to-one Republican, certified the Kennedy electors, in the
absence of "an overwhelming showing of fraud."' 5 While the Republican
tactics had an obvious political motivation, the episode illustrates that in a
state the size of Illinois, 6 any kind of final state determination would be
81. Id. 283. Cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1961, p. 1, col. 4; p. 8, col. 2 (city ed.).
82. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1960, p. 17, col. 1 (city ed.); id. Nov. 30, 1960, p. 29,
col. 1; id. Dec. 2, 1960, p. 17, col. 2; id. Dec. 3, 1960, p. 23, col. 3. Cf. 107 CONG. REc.
A-1402 (1961).
83. Under Illinois law a "discovery" recount, which is of no effect on the official
count or in a subsequent contest, may be undertaken by a defeated candidate in order
to determine whether or not he has grounds for contest. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 46, § 22-6
(Supp. 1960). This proceeding bogged down due to a difference of opinion between the
parties as to the scope of the recount. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1960, p. 22, col. 3; id. Dec.
3, 1960, p. 23, col. 3; id. Dec. 6, 1960, p. 30, col. 1. An attempt to get mandamus requiring the Cook County Canvassing Board to change its result in accordance with the
discovery proceeding failed. Id. Dec. 13, 1960, p. 23, col. 1.
84. The Board, composed of the governor and four other executive officers, is
required to meet within twenty days after the election and "proceed to open and
canvass" the returns from the counties in order to ascertain which presidential electors
are the winners. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 1-3, 7-14, 21-2, 21-3 (1944; Supp. 1960).
The Republican claim was based on a "1912" decision which would permit the Board to
reject county returns. The Democrats consistently argued that the Board had ministerial
powers only and could do no more than tabulate the county canvasses. N.Y. Times, Dec.
1, 1960, p. 22, col. 4 (city ed.) ; id. Dec. 7, 1960, p. 24, col. 3. The Republicans' case
was apparently People ex rel. Hill v. Deneen, 256 Il. 536, 100 N.E. 180 (1912), in which
the state board was permitted to refuse a revised proclamation by a county board based
on a court proceeding in which there was no jurisdiction. The board was directed to
accept the original county canvass. This case is far from giving the state board power
to hear facts and decide a contest for itself. If anything, it stands for the proposition
that the county canvass is conclusive upon the board unless attacked in a proper proceeding, which under Illinois law is a statutory election contest. Supra, note 71. See People
ex rel. Wilson v. Mattinger, 212 Ill. 530, 72 N.E. 996 (1904) ; People ex rel. Ganschinietz v. Renner, 334 Ill. App. 302, 79 N.E.2d 298 (4th Dist. 1948).
85. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1960, p. 39, col. 1 (city ed.).
86. Illinois ranked fourth in the 1960 census, with 10,081,158 inhabitants. Chicago,
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impossible within the time allowed by the Electoral Count Act. The combination of inappropriate procedures, large numbers of votes to be recounted, and
delaying tactics would undoubtedly mean that in any serious contest no
state result could be reached six days prior to the meeting of the electors.
(b) Conflicting Determinations by Different State Authorities. The
question of which state tribunal has been empowered by the legislature to
determine contests could arise either in a dispute between two groups of
men, each claiming to be the same final authority, or between two different
tribunals, each claiming the power to act under a different provision of state
law. The drafters of the Act left the decision of this problem to Congress.
The concurrence of the two Houses was necessary for an affirmative result,
as in any question of the recognition of a state government.8 7 If the Houses
cannot agree on the authoritative determination, or, if, as in the case of
Louisiana in 1873, they agree that no determination was authoritative, the
principle of the Twenty-second Joint Rule is applied and no vote from the
state in question is counted. This result follows regardless of the governor's
action. Congress in this case looks to the executive certificate only as evidence of the decision reached by a tribunal authorized by the state legislature. If the decision of the authorized tribunal cannot be made out, then
there is no valid return for the governor to certify. 88 Congress must here
decide a difficult factual and legal question, in addition to the problems
already noted in the cases of single returns and single state determinations.
(c) No Determination by State Authorities. As the previous discussion
of state contest provisions indicates, this situation is the one most likely to
arise. If the Houses are in agreement, they can decide to count any set of
votes that they find to have been "cast by lawful electors appointed in accordance with the laws of the State." This language presents difficulties.
If double returns are presented they must be based on conflicting versions
of the true state canvass. The decision of the governor should not be
permitted to bind Congress if the state has not made him its final canvassing
authority, but how far may Congress go? Is it limited to determining which
of two contesting bodies is the lawfully appointed canvassing board of the
state, or can it find that the lawfully appointed board has itself violated
state law in the manner of its canvass ?89 If the Act really does embody a
with a population of 3,550,404 is the nation's second largest city. World Almanac 1961

81-82.
87. 8 CONG. REC. 52-54 (1878). See supra, note 30.
88. In the debates and in the final report of the Conference Committee, it is clear
that the provision for the governor's certificate to control in the disagreement of the
Houses was to apply only in the case of double returns without a state determination.
See 17 CONG. REC. 1020, 1022 (Remarks of Senator Hoar); 18 id. 49-50 (Remarks of
Mr. Eden); id. 668 (1887) (Conference Committee Report).
89. This situation might have arisen if the Illinois Election Board had failed to
certify the Kennedy electors. See supra, note 84. In 1877 the Electoral Commission
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policy that Congress may act in the national interest to find the true result
when the states have failed to do so,9° then the latter course should be
permissible. There might be practical limitations on reaching a fair result in
this case, however. If the question were merely one of the legal effect of
the board's action, the decision would be easy to make, but if the board had
taken no action, and there were unresolved contests in the state, Congress
would be ill-equipped to solve the problem on its merits.
If the Houses disagree, then the votes certified by the state executive are
counted. Presumably the Houses could then agree that some or all of the
votes so certified were not "lawful," that is, not "regularly given," 91 and so
reject them. This turnabout, however, is politically unlikely. The provision
reflects a long-standing concern that no votes should fail merely through
disagreement of the Houses, but it seems more dangerous than the ill that
it is meant to cure. In an election where contested votes in one or two states
are decisive, the actual choice of a President will devolve upon the governors,
who may act to serve a personal interest in the outcome.
(d) No Executive Certification; Conflicting Certifications. None of
the returns presented may have a valid certificate because the governor has
refused to certify any electors, or because one who has certified votes may
have done so without authority under state law. There may be two claimants
to the office of governor, or to the right to exercise executive authority
under state law, each of whom.has certified a different return. In these cases
if the two Houses concur, either return may be counted, subject to the
problems noted in the case where there is a governor's certificate. If the
Houses disagree, the clear implication of the Act is that the vote of the
92
state fails altogether, merely through lack of concurrence.
The contest provisions of the Electoral Count Act were intended to
provide a balance of the state interest in the process of appointment and the
federal interest in reaching a result free of fraud or unfairness in time to
inaugurate the winning candidate. If these provisions work as planned
contests over the popular vote will be resolved in a fair manner, and few
matters will be left to the decision of Congress. State contests are not likely
to be effective, however. All disputes-even those involving the facts of the
popular election-will thus be presented to Congress in the first instance.
The questions of fact or law which Congress must resolve in these disputes are problems of the sort which courts are accustomed to decide, but
Congress is not a court. The facts upon which a court bases its decision
would not extend Congressional power beyond an inquiry into the credentials of the
state board. Supra, note 52.
90. This was the view of Mr. Caldwell of Tennessee, House floor manager of the
bill. 18 CONG. REC. 30-31 (1886).
91. Id. 31.
92. 17 id. 2427-2428 (Remarks of Senator Hoar).
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are adduced according to stringent rules of evidence, and the legal questions
before it are decided under long-established canons of construction and interpretation. At best Congress can get its facts at second hand through
the medium of an investigating committee, 93 with only a little further light
to be shed during the brief debate which the Act permits. Moreover, even
if the facts are carefully and completely put before it, Congress is under no
obligation to justify its decision by reference to the evidence or to rules of
law. Courts may not be free from bias and prejudice in their treatment of
the issues before them, but the paraphernalia with which their decisions are
surrounded at least forces them to carry the burden of self-justification.
Moreover, courts decide single cases, whereas Congress would unavoidably
be dealing with the entire range of political questions involved in the election.
There is no way of demonstrating whether each Congressman who votes
on a question such as an electoral contest would pose is deciding it on the
merits, but it is a fair inference that he is not.9 4 Perhaps he should not even
be expected to so decide, since he was elected to serve the political interests
of those whom he represents. Congress is thus not only ill-equipped to solve
the kind of problems which it will face, but is more than likely to decide these
problems according to political needs. It is difficult to imagine public confidence of a high order in an election result arrived at in this manner.
If the Houses of Congress are of differing parties, partisanship may
reach such heights that no decision under the Act is possible. While there is
some question as to the effect of the rejection of votes on the number needed
for a majority,9 5 the situation could arise in which enough votes were
93. In the Senate the Committee on Privileges and Elections, now a standing
sub-committee of the Committee on Rules and Administration, has jurisdiction over
"matters relating to the election of the President, Vice President, or Members of
Congress; corrupt practices; contested elections; credentials and qualifications; Federal
elections generally." Senate Standing Rule XXV 1(o) (1) (D), Senate Manual, S. Doc.
No. 2, 87 Cong., Ist Sess. (1961). Similar jurisdiction is vested in the appropriate
sub-committee of the Committee on House Administration. House Rule XI.9. (K),
House Manual, H.R. Doc. No. 458, 85 Cong., 2d Sess. (1959). See GALLOWAY, THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN CONGRESS 358 (1953).
Cf. the activities of Senate investigators
in 1873, supra, notes 38-40, and committees of both Houses in 1877. DOUGHERTY, op. cit.
supra, note 2, at 141, 164.
94. Congress has long had a reputation for the partisan decision of contests over
its own membership. Out of 382 cases decided in the House between 1789 and 1907
only three members not of the majority party were seated. ALEXANDER, HISTORY AND
PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 313-324 (1916). Decisions in the years
since 1907 seem to have been somewhat less partisan. 1 HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE
UNITED STATES 126n (1938) ; cf. GALLOWAY, op. cit. supra note 93. In the most recent
contest in the House, minority members of the Sub-Committee which had conducted a
partial recount agreed in seating the Democratic candidate, but accused the majority of
partisanship in certain decisions regarding the application of Indiana law. Roush v.
Chambers, H.R. REP. No. 513, 87 Cong., 1st Sess. 65-70 (1961). On the floor Republican members raised the same objection, urging that the state determination should have
been binding, but conceded that to object was "an exercise in futility" in view of the
Democratic majority in the House. 107 CONG. REC. 9647-9661 (daily ed. June 14, 1961).
95. In 1877, because no votes were rejected, the problem never arose. Since the
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rejected to throw the election into the House. 96 If in spite of the provisions
of the Act designed to guard against dilatory tactics, the count is prolonged
past January 20th, the Speaker of the House would assume tho presidency
until one of the candidates should have qualified, or until the next election,
if the deadlock is impenetrable.97 In either case, while the country is not
left without a leader, the public is unlikely to feel that its interests have
been served in the choice.
Congressional control of any phase of the appointment of electors can
be justified only if it serves the interest of all the states in finality and
accuracy of result. The Electoral Count Act gives to Congress a substantial
measure of control, but it fails to serve the requisite national interest. If
a dispute arose the mechanism of the Act would undoubtedly lead Congress
to a final result, but a President chosen in this way could never completely
refute the charge that his title depended on mistake or illegality in the election process.
The Electoral Count Act must be revised to provide for the impartial
and conclusive settlement of all contests arising out of the popular vote.
It is possible that the number of such contests could be reduced by state
election law reform 98 and their effect minimized by change in or abolition
of the Electoral College,09 but prospects for these developments are unclear.
The dangers in an unresolved electoral dispute are clear, however, and provision must be made to meet them, whatever other reforms are enacted.
constitutional language, supra, note 5, calls for election by a majority of the electors
appointed, the answer would seem to depend on whether the votes in question were
rejected because of a failure in the appointment process, or because of a subsequent
failure on the part of the elector. Precedents drawn from other electoral counts are
inconclusive. In 1873 the total announced by the President of the Senate as necessary
for a majority included the votes of Louisiana, even though both sets of electors
had been rejected because neither was found to be supported by a valid canvass. Counting Electoral Votes 408 (Feb. 12, 1873). In the years in which the vote was counted
in the alternative, the number needed for a majority was reduced by the amount of
the questioned votes. In these cases, however, it is clear that a state which cannot
vote at all has not appointed electors. Id. 266 (Feb. 10, 1869) ; see supra, note 30; cf. 11
CONG. REC. 1387 (1881)
(electors voted on wrong day; majority not reduced). On
several occasions the majority figure was reduced to account for electors who had
been appointed, but had not voted through death or disability, Counting Electoral Votes
40 (Feb. 8, 1809) ; id. 50 (Feb. 14, 1821) ; id. 226, 229 (Feb. 8, 1865) ; see STANWOOD,
op. cit. supra, note 14, at 63, 113. This practice is in direct contravention of the express
intention of the Constitutional Convention, supra, note 17. Whatever the precedents, the
sponsors of the Electoral Count Act clearly intended that votes rejected under it would
reduce the number needed for a majority accordingly. 17 CONG. REC. 821 (1886)
(Remarks of Senator Hoar).
96. U.S. Const. amend. XII.
97. For the succession, see U.S. CONS?. amend. XX; 3 U.S.C. § 20 (1958).
98. See HARRIS, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1934) ; cf.
Note, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 279 (1957).
99. See WILMERDING, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 85-86, 115-116 (1958) ; ef. Margolin,

Proposals to Reform Our Electoral System 30, 46, 66 (Library of Cong. Legisl. Ref.
S-rv. 1960).
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There are at least four possible methods by which the present system
might be improved. The basic pattern of the existing legislation could be
retained, with revisions that would make effective its original provisions
for the final determination of state contests by state authority. The existing
legislation could be strengthened by making a state determination within
certain time limits mandatory, with an alternative action in federal court
if the state failed to provide an appropriate procedure. Exclusive jurisdiction of contests could be lodged in the federal courts. Finally, federal control
might be established over all phases of the presidential election. Federal
contest jurisdiction is the most satisfactory of these alternatives. Technical
changes in the present plan would not insure a state finding in every case,
because the requirement of a timely proceeding is not binding. If the state
proceeding was made mandatory, this objection would be met, but the
removal proceedings would be cumbersome and subject to abuse by a
dilatory defendant. A provision for total federal control, which would have
to be made by constitutional amendment, would totally defeat the wisdom of
the original plan by making the executive at least indirectly subject to
control by Congress.
Exclusive federal jurisdiction of contests offers a number of advantages.
It insures that questions which are suitable only for judicial decision are
heard by a tribunal versed in the law and accustomed to the role it must play.
It utilizes the federal judiciary. State judges and other state officials are
often subject to election and may be dependent upon a local political leader
with national ambitions. Federal judges, on the other hand, having life
tenure, are less likely to be influenced by partisan considerations.100 Other
advantages are procedural. Congress can provide a schedule for filing, hearing and decision of all contests. Since this schedule and other rules of
procedure applied by the federal courts will be uniform, a contest in any
state will be decided according to a single standard and within the time
requirements of the electoral system.
For maximum fairness and effectiveness the plan must contain certain
features. Selection of judges on an impartial basis must be provided for in
advance, perhaps by requiring each circuit to establish an election contest
calendar prior to the election.1' 1 The importance of the questions to be
100. Federal judges owe their positions to executive appointment with the advice
and consent of the Senate, but they have life tenure during good behavior and may be
removed only by impeachment. U.S. CONST. art. 11, §§ 2, 4; art. III, § 1; art. I,
§§ 2, 3.
101. In England, where contested seats in Parliament are tried before a two
judge election court, all the judges of the King's Bench Division meet annually to
select three of their number to serve on a special rota for the court during the coming
year. Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Consolidation), 1925, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 64,
§ 67. See Representation of the People Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, ch. 68, §§ 119-137.
Cf. SCoFIELD, PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 503-544 (3d ed. 1959). Efforts to introduce
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decided and their potential for conflict with state authority might justify
trial before a special three judge court. 10 2 The court should have jurisdiction
of all questions arising out of the popular election which affect the validity of
votes and the accuracy and fairness of the count and canvass. To preservestate control over the manner of appointment the court would be bound to
apply state election law in these matters.10 3 The court's jurisdiction should
further extend to questions of the eligibility of the electors under the Constitution. It should be made clear that an objection on these grounds is waived
unless it is raised during the contest proceeding. In addition to the ordinary
powers of a trial court to compel testimony and subpoena documents, the
court should have express power to order the preservation of the ballots for a.
04
recount under the direction of a court-appointed master.
A maximum of sixty days should be allowed between election day and'
the date of meeting of the electors. A complaint could be filed at any time
after the election and until ten days after the completion of the state canvass..
Answer and hearing should follow within ten days at most. This period is.
none too long for settling a controversy in a major state, but the nation
cannot afford a longer period of uncertainty between administrations. At
this point the interest in continuity of government must prevail even over the
interest in an absolutely accurate result. The shortness of the time limit will
be alleviated to some extent by procedures designed to achieve the maximum
speed commensurate with fairness and accuracy. Moreover, the short time
such

a system for congressional contests have been unsuccessful. Haynes, op cit. supra,
note 94, at 122n.
102. These factors led to the present requirement that a three judge court sit
on proceedings where injunction of state action is sought. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-2284
(1958). See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
47-48, 843-849 (1953).
103. Federal courts apply state substantive law in many cases in which they serve
as the forum for the enforcement of state-defined rights. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938) (Diversity jurisdiction) ; Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960)
(Admiralty) ; cases and sources cited in Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1033-34, nn.87-89 (1953) (National bank winding-up, trade-mark
infringement, tax appeal, bankruptcy). Congress in deciding contested congressional
elections, has often claimed the power to view state law as merely advisory in such
questions as the validity of ballots. HAYNES, op. cit. supra note 94, at 155; H.R. REP.
513, supra, note 94, at 22, 69-70. This power is justified in the complete control over its
own elections and contests which the Constitution vests in Congress. U.S. CONST., art.
I, §§ 4, 5. Since there is no such federal control provided over the appointment of
electors, the courts should be limited to the liberty which they now exercise in
appropriate cases to interpret state law freely in the absence of a clear state pronouncement on the point in question.

1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

JIf

0.307-0.309 (2d ed. 1959).

104. To insure that the recount is carried out as quickly and impartially as
possible, great care must be exercised in the selection of the personnel who actually
count the ballots. In the most recent contest in the House, this chore was performed by
auditors from five regional offices of the federal General Accounting Office. H.R. REP.
513, supra, note 94, at 12. If it is objected that what are essentially executive employees should not participate in the count of the presidential vote, then the court might
be authorized to assign private accountants to the job.
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limitations will tend to prevent the bringing of exploratory contests without
specific claims of mistake or fraud. Provision for direct appeal to the Supreme Court within the time limit should be made.
To eliminate the double return problem altogether, the court rather than
the state governor should certify the electors to Congress, even in states
where no contest has been brought. Upon completion of the canvass the final
state canvassing authority should certify its results to the appropriate court.
If a contest has been, or is filed, the court should hear it and certify the
result to Congress. If no contest is filed within ten days after the final state
canvass is received, the court should forward the state certificate with the
endorsement that it is uncontested. In any case Congress will be bound to
accept as duly appointed and as eligible those electors named in the certificate
of the court, subject to the action of the Supreme Court on appeal.
Certain questions will necessarily remain for Congress to decide. As
previously noted, no other authority can determine the right of a state to
participate in an election, or of a given government to represent it. 105 If
such a situation arose, the court might properly refuse jurisdiction. As long
as there are electors, there will be the possibility that they will carry out their
trust in a fraudulent or erroneous manner. The vestigial nature of the
office and the publicity attendant on any effort to corrupt them decrease the
probability that such problems will arise. If they do come up, they must be
left to Congress. A tribunal can be appointed to find the facts, but the action
which Congress will take on the findings is not as clear as in the case of a
contested election. Whether a given deviation is sufficient ground for disfranchizing all who voted for a challenged elector is a policy question which
only Congress should answer. 10 6 Finally, if for some reason the judicial
system failed to reach a result, the old problems would be present. This
situation, too, is an unlikely one. Should it come to pass, Congress would
have to decide the underlying questions as best it could.
In those questions which are remitted to Congress, the present provision
for acceptance only by the separate and concurrent vote of the two Houses
should be retained. No plan can eliminate the political motivations of individual legislators. When the two Houses act as legislative bodies, however,
individual prejudice is at one remove from the final decision, and they may
serve as a check on one another. If the Houses are divided, they reflect a
divided sentiment in the country. In these circumstances it is better that a
vote not be counted at all than that one House be able to dictate a result.
105. Supra, p. 5; note 30.
106. All of these problems would be resolved by what one political scientist has
pointed out to be the simplest and least controversial of all Electoral College reformseliminating the office of elector. Burns, A New Course for the Electoral College, New

York Times, Dec. 18, 1960 (magazine), p. 10, at 28. President Kennedy proposed such
a change as a Senator in 1957. S.J. Res. 132, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. The Kennedy plan
is again pending in the Senate. See infra, note 117.
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The effect of the rejection of votes on the number needed for a
majority should be made clear. 10 7 If it is found that there was no valid
election in a state, then no electors were appointed there, and the number
needed for a majority should not include the votes of that state. Likewise,
the votes of a state excluded from the count by Congress for failure to comply
with the conditions of statehood do not reflect electors who have been appointed, and should reduce the majority figure accordingly. When votes are
rejected for reasons that do not have to do with failure of appointment,
10 8
rejection should have no effect on the majority.
A statutory provision for federal court jurisdiction of contests over the
appointment of presidential electors could be enacted by Congress under
the Constitution as it now stands. Until the passage of the Electoral Count
Act of 1887 Congress had always refused to look into the facts of a state
election. It was often suggested, however, that Congress could, by legislation
passed prior to the election, give itself the power to do so. The Electoral
Count Act may be construed as an expression of this view. 109 If Congress
itself can step in to protect the national interest in honest and accurate election results, there would seem to be nothing to prevent the delegation of the
task to the federal courts.
The power of Congress to establish federal jurisdiction over contests in
presidential elections has never been ruled on by the courts. In the absence
of specific provision it is clear that no such jurisdiction exists.110 The Supreme Court has recognized that state power over the appointment of
electors is broad enough to justify state prosecution of violations of state
law in presidential elections.1 ' This state jurisdiction is not exclusive,
however. The federal courts would undoubtedly take jurisdiction of a
criminal or civil proceeding under the appropriate Civil Rights Acts, based
on a discriminatory deprivation by state action of the right to vote in a
107.

See supra, note 95.

108. The distinction

may be difficult to make. Has an ineligible elector been
When votes are rejected merely because the Houses disagree, has the
state appointed electors? Questions of interpretation such as this must await an
actual case.
109. See H.R. REP. No. 31, supra, note 23, at 84-88; cf., supra, note 54.
110. See State ex rel. Barker v. Bowen, 8 S.C. 382 (1876). Congress has given
the District Courts jurisdiction of election disputes in which the sole question arises
out of the denial of the right to vote on account of race, creed, color, or previous
condition of servitude. The offices of elector, Senator, representative, and state legislator are excluded from these provisions, however. 28 U.S.C. § 1344 (1958).
The
provision has been held to bar federal jurisdiction over a contest in a primary election
for United States Senator. Johnson v. Stevenson, 170 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 904 (1949). After the 1960 presidential election jurisdiction over a
contest proceeding was refused by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas. New York Times, Dec. 13, 1960, p. 23, col. 1 (city ed.).
111. In re Green, 154 U.S. 377 (1890). As to the variety of methods of appointment permissible, see McPherson v. Blecker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
"appointed"?
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presidential election. 112 Moreover, the court has upheld statutory criminal
penalties for individual action which interferes with the lawful conduct of
presidential elections. This decision was justified on the ground that
Congress has inherent power to protect the vital structure of the nation by
1
preserving the purity of elections.' 3
With this inherent power Congress may provide a means for settling
contests over the appointment of electors. Each state has a right to control
the manner of appointment of its electors, but this right does not permit a
state to determine that it shall appoint no electors, or that its appointment
process shall be tainted with fraud or error. Any candidate for the office
of elector, or any voter for that office, as a citizen of the United States, has
a right to insist that the states carry out their function in a manner that
will insure the integrity of the national government. That right is one granted
by the federal Constitution. The mere fact that the Constitution provides
that the right shall be made effective through state law does not deprive the
federal courts of jurisdiction. There are numerous other situations in which
rights that are defined by state law may be enforced in federal court. 1 4 In
each such instance a national interest is present which establishes the right
to federal enforcement. Diversity jurisdiction embodies a national interest in
providing justice for citizens outside of their own states." 5 The interest
involved in admiralty is that in having a single forum to dispense a uniform
maritime law. 116 Here, the clear national interest is in preserving national
stability through a fair and accurate presidential election.
Although there are strong arguments in favor of congressional power to
provide by statute for electoral contests, it would be desirable to make the
necessary changes by constitutional amendment. Legislation is now pending
in Congress for amendments which would provide other much-needed reforms
in the electoral system. 117 If an amendment is finally passed that alters the
112. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) ; cf. James v. Bowman, 190
U.S. 127 (1903) ; see Wilkinson, The Electoral Process and the Power of the States,
47 A.B.A.J. 251, 252-3 (1961).
113. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934). The decision was based
on the broad language of Ex Parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), which did not
distinguish between congressional and presidential elections in holding that Congress
could legislate to preserve the rights of citizens that were essential to the continuance
of the government. These cases may be distinguished from Walker v. United States,
93 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 644; reh. denied, 303 U.S. 668 (1938)
in which it was held that a conspiracy against the right to vote for presidential electors
could not be prosecuted under a federal statute making conspiracy to injure a citizen
in his constitutional rights a crime. The latter case holds only that the citizen's individual right to vote is not protected by the Constitution, since it is subject to the
control of the state legislatures. The power of Congress to protect the integrity of
elections remains unchallenged.
114. See supra, note 103.
115. See HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra, note 102, at 892-893.
116. Id. 20-21, 789-790.
117. See S. 102, a proposal for "a commission to study and propose improvements
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system in such a way that the requirements for contest provisions will be
radically changed, the location of the power to resolve contests under it
should be made explicit. Even if the basic structure of the electoral system
is altered only in minor detail, the chance to make a new provision for
contests should not be overlooked. At the very least, an amendment should
provide that Congress may resolve, or pass legislation to resolve, all controversies arising out of the count or canvass of the popular vote. 118 Whilesuch a provision would finally settle the question of the location of the
power to resolve disputes, it would not insure a timely and accurate resolution in every contest. Even if Congress were to pass legislation, there is
good reason to expect that in a real crisis the provisions might be evaded or
ignored altogether. Clearly, if the President approved, legislation providing
an ad hoc political solution for a particular crisis could be passed, whatever
prior statutes said. For this reason a constitutional amendment should make
clear that contests involving the popular vote are to be decided by the federal
courts in a trial on the merits. The plan could then be implemented by legislation similar to that suggested in the absence of constitutional change.
In a government of divided powers, no judicial decision, however fair,
can prevent Congress from exercising its political authority in the election
of a President. On the other hand, a Congress which hopes to preserve
political stability cannot exercise its authority in a manner that is so clearly
erroneous or self-seeking that it is offensive to the electorate at large. A
legislative scheme that provides stringent measures for the fair decision of
election contests will act as a check on arbitrary action. If Congress ignores
or evades such a scheme, it carries a heavy burden of demonstrating that it
has governed fairly. The present system for resolving contests imposes no
such burden. Fair-minded men could reach a fair result under it, but unfair
in the methods of nominating and electing the President and Vice President"; S.J. Res1, a proposal for a Constitutional amendment to abolish the electoral college altogether
in favor of direct popular election, including power in Congress to provide by legislation for the settlement of controversies; S.J. Res. 2, a proposed amendment to abolish
the electors and to apportion the electoral vote among the candidates according to the
proportion of the popular vote each has received; S.J. Res. 4, a proposal similar to
S.J. Res. 2, with the proviso that if no candidate gets at least 40% of the vote a
combined session of the House and Senate will choose the President and Vice President;
S.J. Res. 12, a proposed amendment that would divide the states into equal districts
in which each person votes for a district elector and for two electors at large; S.J.

Res. 17, a proposal similar in effect to S.J. Res. 1, supra, with no provision for
settling controversies and with some additional features S.J. Res. 28, a reintroduction
of S.J. Res. 2, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., in the form in which it passed the Senate in 1950,
a proposal generally similar to S.J. Res. 4, supra; S.J. Res. 113, a proposal embodying

the Kennedy plan, supra, note 106. Similar measures have been introduced in the
House. Hearings began before the Senate Constitutional Amendments sub-committee
on May 23, 1961. New York Times, May 24, 1961, p. 13, col. 1 (city ed.). For a
general discussion of the various proposals, see Margolin, op. cit. supra, note 99.
118. The only measure presently pending which deals with the problems of contests
has such a provision. S. 102, supra, note 117.
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men could easily act to serve their own interests. In either case there is no
certainty that the result reached is the true one.
The President of the Untied States will increasingly require strength
based on national and international respect if he is to guide the nation through
times of mounting crisis. This respect will not come to one who is elected
under the slightest suspicion of error or fraud. To insure that no electoral
contest will mar or disrupt the orderly succession to the presidency in the
difficult future, Congress must give to the federal courts the power to reach
a timely, final, and binding decision of all controversies.

